Peter van Inwagen : materialism, free will and God /: materialism, free will and God. (2018)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: Ludger Jansen, Paul M. Näger, editors.
• Editors: Jansen, Ludger; Näger, Paul M
• Contents: Intro; Preface; Contents; About the Editors; Chapter 1: The Problem of Free Will Revisited; 1.1 Four Theses; 1.2 The Dialectical Situation; 1.3 The Statement of the Problem; References; Chapter 2: Rational Peer Disagreement upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Revealed Peer Disagreement: The Puzzle According to van Inwagen; 2.2.1 The Situation in General; 2.2.2 Viewing RPD in a Schematic Way; 2.2.3 Disagreement for Real: How to React Rationally?; 2.3 Four Attempts to Solve the Puzzle; 2.4 Two Hidden Assumptions and a Decisive Tension 2.4.1 A First Way Out? Philosophical Exceptionalism2.4.2 A Second Hidden Assumption: Fallibilism vs. Truth-Tracking Intuitions; 2.5 Rational Peer Disagreement Upon Sufficient Evidence; 2.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Ontological Commitments, Ordinary Language and Theory Choice; 3.1 Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Proposed Meta-Ontology; 3.1.1 The Semantic Question; 3.1.2 The Methodological/Epistemic Question; 3.1.3 Meta-Ontologists; 3.2 Challenging the Proposed Meta-Ontology; 3.2.1 Ontological Commitments and Ordinary Language; 3.2.2 Theory Choice in Ontology; 3.3 Conclusion; References Chapter 4: Physical Composition by Bonding4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Dismissal of Bonding; 4.3 A Scientific Ontology; 4.4 Bonding Implies Spatial Confinement; 4.5 Bonding Is not Just Interaction; 4.6 Bonding as a Relation Between Kinetic and Potential Energy; 4.7 Composition by Bonding; 4.8 Discussion; 4.8.1 Comparison with Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Concepts of Bonding; 4.8.2 Advantages of Bonding as a Criterion for Physical Composition; 4.8.3 Some Non-obvious Consequences; 4.8.4 Combining the Criteria: Physical Bodies and Living Organisms; References Chapter 5: Why It Would Not Be Better Not to Believe in Material Artifacts â#x80;#x93; Even If One Could Get Away With It5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Arguments Against Material Artifacts; 5.2.1 The Gollyswoggle Argument; 5.2.2 The Living Hammock Argument; 5.2.3 The House of the Wise Pig Argument; 5.3 Why It Is Better to Believe in Artifacts; 5.3.1 An Adequate Conception of Artifactuality; 5.3.2 The Anthropological Significance of Artifacts; 5.3.3 Explanatory Power of Functional Talk; 5.3.4 Copyright Law Acknowledges the Importance of Creation; 5.4 Conclusion; References Chapter 6: Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Do Not Have in Common6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Theory of Fictional Characters; 6.3 The That-Claim; 6.3.1 The Criterion of Ontological Commitment; 6.3.2 Against Paraphrase; 6.4 The What-Claim; 6.4.1 Van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Taxonomy of Theoretical Entities; 6.4.2 What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Have in Common; 6.4.3 Having and Holding: The Stipulative Strategy; 6.5 Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: Problems with van Inwagenâ#x80;#x99;s Analogy
• Publisher Details: Cham, Switzerland : Springer
• Publication Date: 2018
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 123/.5; Free will and determinism; PHILOSOPHY / Free Will & Determinism; Free will and determinism; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9783319700526; 3319700529
• Related ISBNs: 9783319700519; 3319700510
• Notes: Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (Ebsco, viewed February 19, 2018).
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.