A critical introduction to philosophy of language : central themes from Locke to Wittgenstein /: central themes from Locke to Wittgenstein. (2019)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: John Fennell.
• Authors: (Associate Professor of Philosophy), Fennell, John
• Contents: Introduction: Logico-Semantics, Logical Positivism and their Discontents Chapter One: The Classical Empiricist Account of Meaning § 1.1: The Inessentiality of language § 1.2: The "‘Idea’ Idea" § 1.3: The Primacy of the Naming Relation § 1.4: The Linguistic Turn, Anti-Psychologism, and the Primacy of the Sentence § 1.5: Logical Analysis Chapter Two: Classical Empiricism and the Problem of the A Priori: Mill, Kant, and Frege § 2.1: Some Background Distinctions: A Priori/A Posteriori, Analytic/Synthetic, Necessary/Contingent § 2.2: Mill § 2.3: Kant § 2.4: Frege § 2.5: Appendix: Russell’s Set-Theoretic Paradox Chapter Three: Frege’s Begriffsschrift § 3.1: Logic and its Limitations § 3.2: Function and Argument § 3.3: Predicates, Quantifiers and the Solution to the Problem of Multiple Generality § 3.4: Sentence Connectives and the Solution to the Problem of a Unified Logical Notation § 3.5: Identity § 3.6: Appendix: Concordance between Begriffsschrift Notation and the Kalish/Montague/Mar Notation Chapter Four: Frege on Sense and Reference § 4.1: Three Semantic Puzzles for a Reference-Only (Extensionalist) Account of Meaning § 4.2: The Sense/Reference Distinction § 4.3: The Problems of Non-Referring Singular Terms and Identity Statements § 4.4: The Problem of Belief Contexts § 4.5: Problems with Frege’s Solution § 4.6: Definite Descriptions and Some Further Consequences of Frege’s Sense/Reference Distinction Chapter Five: Russell’s Theory of Descriptions § 5.1: Scope and Basic Strategy of the Theory of Descriptions § 5.2: The Theory Applied to Definite Descriptions, including Non-Referring Definite Descriptions § 5.3: Four Key Features of Russell’s Analysis of Definite Descriptions § 5.4: Russell’s Solutions to Some Semantic Puzzles § 5.5: Russell’s Theory and Excluded Middle § 5.6: Critical Discussion (I): Strawson § 5.7: Critical Discussion (II): Donnellan Chapter Six: Kripke’s Causal Theory of Reference § 6.1: Core Features of Russell’s Theory § 6.2: Three Key Problems for Russell’s Description Theory § 6.3: The Cluster Theory and its Analogous Problems § 6.4: Correct Descriptions are neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Names to Refer § 6.5: The Causal Theory of Reference-Grounding and Reference-Borrowing § 6.6: The Causal Theory’s Solution to the Three Problems § 6.7: Rigid Designation and Necessary A Posteriori Propositions § 6.8: The Distinction between Fixing the Reference and Giving the Meaning § 6.9: The Contingency of ‘Hesperus is the evening star’ v . The Necessity of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ § 6.10: Problems for Kripke’s View Chapter Seven: Logical Positivism I: Ayer § 7.1: Three Central Doctrines of Logical Positivism § 7.2: Realist v . Anti-Realist Accounts of Meaning § 7.3: Versions of the Verification Principle § 7.4: The Problem of the A Priori (again) § 7.5: Questions regarding Conventionalism about Necessity and Logic Chapter Eight: Logical Positivism II: Carnap § 8.1: Conventionalism § 8.2: Linguistic Frameworks § 8.3: Internal v . External Questions and Formal v . Material Mode § 8.4: Metaphysics and Tolerance § 8.5: The Status of Philosophy Chapter Nine: Quine’s Critique of Positivism I: ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ § 9.1: ‘No Entity without Identity’ § 9.2: Two Different Conceptions of Synonymy: Definition and Substitution § 9.3: Epistemic Holism and the Rejection of Meaning and Synonymy § 9.4: Epistemic Holism and the Elimination of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction § 9.5: Epistemic Holism and the Web of Belief § 9.6: Epistemic Holism, Fallibilism and the History of Science Chapter Ten: Quine’s Critique of Positivism II: Anti-Conventionalism § 10.1: Quine’s Problems with Conventionalism § 10.2: Quine’s Pragmatic Account of Logic and Necessity § 10.3: Problems with Quine’s Pragmatization of Logic: Dummett and Davidson Chapter Eleven: Quine: Radical Translation and the Indeterminacy of Meaning § 11.1: Occasion Sentences, Standing Sentences, Stimulus Meaning, and Stimulus Synonymy § 11.2: The Argument for Indeterminacy: Holism and Behaviorism § 11.3: First-Personal and Ontological Indeterminacy v . Third-Personal and Epistemological Under-Determination § 11.4: The Principle of Charity: Pragmatic or Constitutive § 11.5: Some Problems with Charity and Logic. Chapter Twelve: Later-Wittgenstein I: Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Critique of Ostension § 12.1: Ordinary Language Philosophy, Grammatical Investigations and Language Games § 12.2: The Critique of the Augustinian Picture: The Language Games of the Grocer and the Builders § 12.3: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Ostensive Definition Chapter Thirteen: Later-Wittgenstein II: The Rule-Following Considerations § 13.1: The Problem of Meaning Scepticism § 13.2: Algorithms and Dispositions § 13.3: Kripke’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Community Dispositionalism and the ‘Sceptical Solution’ § 13.4: Textual Evidence For and Against Kripke’s Interpretation of Wittgenstein § 13.5: Normatively-Rich Practices: Sociality § 13.6: Normatively-Rich Practices: Contextualism and Fallibilism Chapter Fourteen: Later-Wittgenstein III: The Private Language Argument § 14.1: The Relation between the Rule-Following Discussion and the Private Language Argument § 14.2: The ‘Independent Check’ Argument § 14.3: The Independent Check Argument Evaluated: Ayer’s Objection and Kripke’s Footnote 47 § 14.4: The Grammatical Status of Two Statements of Privacy § 14.5: The Expressive (Not Descriptive) Grammar of Sensation Talk § 14.6: Wittgenstein and Behaviorism
• Edition: 1st
• Publisher Details: London : Routledge
• Publication Date: 2019
• Extent: 1 online resource, illustrations (black and white)
• Subjects: 401; Language and languages -- Philosophy
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9780429649066; 9780429651700; 9780429646423; 9780429026553
• Related ISBNs: 9781138339712; 9781138339729
• Notes: Note: Description based on CIP data; resource not viewed.
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.