Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes. (2017)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
• Authors: Gehrlein, William V; Lepelley, Dominique
• Contents: Preface; Contents; List of Abbreviations; Chapter 1: Elections and Voting Paradoxes; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 A Tale of Two Mathematicians; 1.3 The Historic Analyses of Borda and Condorcet; 1.3.1 Borda's Paradox; 1.3.2 Borda's Solution to the Possibility of Borda's Paradox; 1.3.3 Condorcet's Paradox; 1.3.4 Condorcet's Other Paradox; 1.3.5 Borda Versus Condorcet: Over 200 Years Later; 1.4 Other Voting Paradoxes; 1.4.1 Monotonicity Paradoxes; 1.4.2 Choice Set Variance Paradoxes; 1.4.2.1 Ostrogorski's Paradox. 1.4.2.2 Majority Paradox1.4.2.3 Referendum Paradox; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Models with Independent Voter Preferences; 2.2.1 The Dual Culture Condition; 2.2.2 Impartial Culture Condition; 2.2.3 Condorcet's Paradox and Social Homogeneity with DC; 2.2.4 Condorcet Efficiency with DC; 2.3 Models with Dependent Voter Preferences; 2.3.1 The Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition; 2.3.2 Condorcet's Paradox and Dependent Preferences with IAC. 2.3.3 Condorcet Efficiency and Dependent Preferences with IAC2.4 The Relevance of DC, IC, UC and IAC Models; 2.4.1 Performing Empirically-Based Evaluations of Theory; 2.4.2 An Empirically Based Evaluation of Preliminary Results; 2.5 The Likelihood of Observing Other Voting Paradoxes; 2.5.1 Borda's Paradox; 2.5.2 Condorcet's Other Paradox; 2.5.3 The No Show Paradox; 2.5.4 Ostrogorski's Paradox; 2.5.5 The Majority Paradox; 2.5.6 The Referendum Paradox; 2.6 Adding Additional Internal Structure to Voters ́Preferences; 2.7 Conclusion. 3.6 Strong Measures of Group Mutual Coherence3.7 Refined Measures of Group Mutual Coherence; 3.8 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single-Stage Election Procedures; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 To Rank or Not to Rank; 4.3 Increases in Efficiency from Using Ranked Preferences; 4.4 Efficiency Relationships to Group Mutual Coherence; 4.4.1 Condorcet Efficiency Relationships with Weak Measures; 4.4.2 Condorcet Efficiency Relationships with Strong Measures; 4.5 Modifications to Restrict Attention to Critical Situations.
• Publisher Details: Cham : Springer
• Publication Date: 2017
• Copyright Date: 2017
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 324.6; Economics; Elections -- Rules; Voting -- Rules; POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Process -- Elections; POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Process -- General; Elections; Voting; Economics; Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice; Electoral Politics; Game Theory; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Political Science -- Political Ideologies -- Democracy; Mathematics -- Game Theory; Business & Economics -- Operations Research; Elections & referenda; Game theory; Operational research; Management science; Welfare economics; Elections; Game theory; Operations research; Business & Economics -- Economics -- Theory; Economic theory & philosophy; Electronic books; Rules
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9783319646596; 3319646591; 3319646583; 9783319646589
• Related ISBNs: 3319646583; 9783319646589
• Notes: Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed October 25, 2017).
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.