Redesigning democracy : more ideas for better rules /: more ideas for better rules. ([2017])
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Redesigning democracy : more ideas for better rules /: more ideas for better rules. ([2017])
- Main Title:
- Redesigning democracy : more ideas for better rules
- Further Information:
- Note: Hans Gersbach.
- Authors:
- Gersbach, Hans
- Contents:
- Preface; Contents; Part I Contractual Democracy; 1 Introduction to Part I; 1.1 A Metaphor?; 1.2 Political Contract: Definition; 1.3 Does Any Campaign Promise Qualify as Contract Matter?; 1.4 Punishment and Rewards; 1.5 Renegotiation -- Negative Effects; 1.6 Retrospect and New Developments; 1.7 Background; References; 2 Retrospect -- Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts; 2.1 Background; 2.2 Introduction; 2.3 Model and Assumptions; 2.4 Elections; 2.5 Competition for the Incentive Contracts; 2.6 Competition Without Commitment; 2.7 Asymmetric Information. 2.8 Discussion and ConclusionReferences; 3 Vote-share Contracts Without Signaling of Competence; 3.1 Background; 3.2 Introduction; 3.3 The Model; 3.3.1 Agents; 3.3.2 Policies; 3.3.3 Utilities; 3.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 3.3.5 The Overall Game; 3.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 3.4 Elections Alone; 3.4.1 The Second Period; 3.4.2 The First Period; 3.5 Vote-share Contracts; 3.5.1 Vote-shares as Political Contracts; 3.5.2 The Second and First Period; 3.5.3 Competition for Vote-share Contracts and Welfare; 3.6 Extensions and Ramifications; 3.6.1 Incumbency Advantages. 3.6.2 Ramifications and Applications3.7 Conclusion; References; 4 Vote Thresholds With Signaling of Competence; 4.1 Background; 4.2 Introduction; 4.3 The Model; 4.3.1 Agents; 4.3.2 Policies; 4.3.3 Utilities; 4.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 4.3.5 The Overall Game; 4.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 4.4 Elections Alone; 4.4.1 The SecondPreface; Contents; Part I Contractual Democracy; 1 Introduction to Part I; 1.1 A Metaphor?; 1.2 Political Contract: Definition; 1.3 Does Any Campaign Promise Qualify as Contract Matter?; 1.4 Punishment and Rewards; 1.5 Renegotiation -- Negative Effects; 1.6 Retrospect and New Developments; 1.7 Background; References; 2 Retrospect -- Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts; 2.1 Background; 2.2 Introduction; 2.3 Model and Assumptions; 2.4 Elections; 2.5 Competition for the Incentive Contracts; 2.6 Competition Without Commitment; 2.7 Asymmetric Information. 2.8 Discussion and ConclusionReferences; 3 Vote-share Contracts Without Signaling of Competence; 3.1 Background; 3.2 Introduction; 3.3 The Model; 3.3.1 Agents; 3.3.2 Policies; 3.3.3 Utilities; 3.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 3.3.5 The Overall Game; 3.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 3.4 Elections Alone; 3.4.1 The Second Period; 3.4.2 The First Period; 3.5 Vote-share Contracts; 3.5.1 Vote-shares as Political Contracts; 3.5.2 The Second and First Period; 3.5.3 Competition for Vote-share Contracts and Welfare; 3.6 Extensions and Ramifications; 3.6.1 Incumbency Advantages. 3.6.2 Ramifications and Applications3.7 Conclusion; References; 4 Vote Thresholds With Signaling of Competence; 4.1 Background; 4.2 Introduction; 4.3 The Model; 4.3.1 Agents; 4.3.2 Policies; 4.3.3 Utilities; 4.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 4.3.5 The Overall Game; 4.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 4.4 Elections Alone; 4.4.1 The Second Period; 4.4.2 The First Period; 4.5 Vote-share Thresholds; 4.5.1 The First Period; 4.5.2 Welfare Properties; 4.5.3 Welfare Impact of Higher Vote Thresholds; 4.5.4 Competition for Vote Thresholds; 4.6 Extensions, Applications and Generalizations. 4.6.1 Further Incumbency Advantages4.6.2 Learning by Doing; 4.6.3 Alternative Election Procedures; 4.6.4 Repeated Competition With Vote Thresholds; 4.6.5 Generalizations of the Model; 4.7 Conclusion; References; 5 Information Markets, Elections and Threshold Contracts; 5.1 Background; 5.2 Introduction; 5.3 The Basic Model; 5.3.1 The Election Framework; 5.3.2 The Information Structure; 5.3.3 Reelection Schemes; 5.3.4 Preferences of Politicians; 5.3.5 Summary and Welfare Criterion; 5.4 Elections Only; 5.4.1 Behavior of Dissonant Politicians; 5.4.2 Behavior of Congruent Politicians. 5.5 The Triple Mechanism5.5.1 Reelection Thresholds; 5.5.2 Reelection Schemes; 5.5.3 Summary; 5.5.4 Robust Election Scheme; 5.5.5 Equilibrium Notion; 5.5.6 Equilibria; 5.6 Extensions, Robustness and Pitfalls; 5.6.1 Monotonic Election Scheme and Overpromising; 5.6.2 Sophisticated Election Scheme; 5.6.3 Market-Based Voting; 5.6.4 Repeated Action; 5.6.5 More Candidates; 5.6.6 Manipulations; 5.7 Conclusion; References; 6 Limits of Contractual Democracy -- Competition for Wages and Office; 6.1 Background; 6.2 Introduction; 6.3 The Model; 6.3.1 The Set-Up; 6.3.2 Assumptions and Economic Problem. … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Cham, Switzerland : Springer
- Publication Date:
- 2017
- Copyright Date:
- 2017
- Extent:
- 1 online resource
- Subjects:
- 321.80151
Economics
Democracy -- Mathematical models
Elections
Management science
Welfare economics
Democracy
Public finance
Political economy
Economic theory
Law and economics
POLITICAL SCIENCE -- General
Democracy -- Mathematical models
Elections
Political Science -- Political Ideologies -- Democracy
Business & Economics -- Public Finance
Political Science -- Economic Conditions
Business & Economics -- Economics -- Theory
Law -- Commercial -- General
Political structures: democracy
Public finance
Political economy
Economic theory & philosophy
International economic & trade law
Economics
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice
Democracy
Public Economics
Political Economy
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Law and Economics
Electronic books - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9783319534053
- Related ISBNs:
- 331953405X
9783319534046
3319534041 - Notes:
- Note: Includes bibliographical references.
Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed April 12, 2017). - Access Rights:
- Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
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- Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.
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- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD.DS.364727
- Ingest File:
- 03_017.xml