Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas. ([2018])
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas. ([2018])
- Main Title:
- Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas
- Further Information:
- Note: Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.
- Authors:
- Zhang, Laobing
Reniers, Genserik L. L - Contents:
- Intro; Introduction; Reference; Contents; List of Figures; Chapter 1: Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: The State of the Art; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Safety and Security Definitions and Differences; 1.3 Security in a Single Chemical Plant; 1.3.1 The Need of Improving Security in Chemical Plants; 1.3.2 Challenges with Respect to Improving Chemical Security; 1.3.3 Security Risk Assessment in Chemical Plants: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.3.4 Drawbacks of Current Methodologies; 1.4 Protection of Chemical Industrial Parks (CIPs) or So-Called Chemical Clusters 1.4.1 Security Within Chemical Clusters1.4.2 Chemical Cluster Security: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.4.3 Future Promising Research Directions on Cluster Security; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory, Setting the Scene; 2.1.1 Introduction; 2.1.2 Players; 2.1.3 Strategy (Set); 2.1.4 Payoff; 2.1.5 The Assumption of `Common Knowledge;́ 2.1.6 The Assumption of `Rationality;́ 2.1.7 Simultaneous and Sequential Game; 2.2 Game Theoretic Models with a Discrete Set of Strategies 2.2.1 Discrete and Continuous Set of Strategies2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium; 2.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 2.3 Criticisms on Game Theoretic Models for Security Improvement; 2.4 Integrating Conventional Security Risk Assessment Methodologies and Game Theory for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Single Plant Protection: AIntro; Introduction; Reference; Contents; List of Figures; Chapter 1: Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: The State of the Art; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Safety and Security Definitions and Differences; 1.3 Security in a Single Chemical Plant; 1.3.1 The Need of Improving Security in Chemical Plants; 1.3.2 Challenges with Respect to Improving Chemical Security; 1.3.3 Security Risk Assessment in Chemical Plants: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.3.4 Drawbacks of Current Methodologies; 1.4 Protection of Chemical Industrial Parks (CIPs) or So-Called Chemical Clusters 1.4.1 Security Within Chemical Clusters1.4.2 Chemical Cluster Security: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.4.3 Future Promising Research Directions on Cluster Security; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory, Setting the Scene; 2.1.1 Introduction; 2.1.2 Players; 2.1.3 Strategy (Set); 2.1.4 Payoff; 2.1.5 The Assumption of `Common Knowledge;́ 2.1.6 The Assumption of `Rationality;́ 2.1.7 Simultaneous and Sequential Game; 2.2 Game Theoretic Models with a Discrete Set of Strategies 2.2.1 Discrete and Continuous Set of Strategies2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium; 2.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 2.3 Criticisms on Game Theoretic Models for Security Improvement; 2.4 Integrating Conventional Security Risk Assessment Methodologies and Game Theory for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 3.1 General Intrusion Detection Approach in Chemical Plants; 3.2 Game-Theoretical Modelling: The Chemical Plant Protection Game (CPP Game); 3.2.1 Players; 3.2.2 Strategies 3.2.3 Payoffs3.3 Solutions for the CPP Game; 3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.4 CPP Game from an Industrial Practice Point of View; 3.4.1 Input Analysis; 3.4.2 Output Analysis; 3.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-Free Uncertainties; 4.1 Motivation; 4.2 Interval CPP Game Definition; 4.3 Interval Bi-Matrix Game Solver (IBGS); 4.4 Parameter Coupling; 4.5 Interval CPP Game Solver (ICGS); 4.6 Conclusion; References Chapter 5: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game Involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality5.1 Motivation; 5.2 Epsilon-Optimal Attacker; 5.2.1 Definition of an `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.2 Game Modelling of the `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.3 Solving the CPP Game with `Epsilon-Optimal Attackers;́ 5.3 Monotonic Optimal Attacker; 5.3.1 Definition of a `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.2 Game Modelling of the `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.3 Calculating the MoSICP; 5.4 MiniMax Attacker; 5.4.1 Definition of a `MiniMax Attackeŕ … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Cham, Switzerland : Springer
- Publication Date:
- 2018
- Copyright Date:
- 2018
- Extent:
- 1 online resource
- Subjects:
- 660
Economics
Chemical industry -- Security measures
Game theory
Chemical plants -- Safety measures
Chemical industry -- Risk assessment
SCIENCE / Chemistry / Industrial & Technical
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Chemical & Biochemical
Chemical plants -- Safety measures
Game theory
Economics
Game Theory
Security Science and Technology
Industrial Chemistry/Chemical Engineering
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
Technology & Engineering -- Engineering (General)
Science -- Chemistry -- Industrial & Technical
Mathematics -- Game Theory
Business & Economics -- Operations Research
Mathematics -- Applied
Security & fire alarm systems
Industrial chemistry
Game theory
Operational research
Mathematical modelling
Management science
Chemical engineering
Mathematics
Operations research
Electronic books - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9783319926186
3319926187
3319926179
9783319926179 - Related ISBNs:
- 9783319926179
3319926179 - Notes:
- Note: Includes bibliographical references.
Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed July 17, 2018). - Access Rights:
- Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
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- British Library HMNTS - ELD.DS.358815
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