Game theory in management accounting : implementing incentives and fairness /: implementing incentives and fairness. ([2018])

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: David Mueller, Ralf Trost, editors.
• Editors: Mueller, David; Trost, Ralf, 1959-
• Contents: Preface; Contents; About the Editors; Part I Non-cooperative Models: The Design of Incentives and the Analysis of Preferences; Setting Incentives for Managers: Incentive Compatibility, Similarity Rule, and Goal Congruence; Contents; 1 Management Accounting and the Postulate of Incentive Compatibility; 2 The Game Theoretical Approach to Incentive Compatibility; 2.1 Defining Incentive Compatibility in Mechanism Design Theory; 2.1.1 Basic Definitions; 2.1.2 The Case of Ignorance About the Other Players' True Types; 2.1.3 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility. 2.2 Incentive Compatibility in Allocation Mechanisms2.3 Incentive Compatibility in Decentralized Investment Decision Making; 2.4 From Incentive Compatible Allocation Mechanisms to Principal Agent Theory; 3 The Case of One Principal and One Agent; 3.1 The Principal Agent Model; 3.2 Simplified Approaches to Incentive Compatibility: Similarity Rule and Goal Congruence; 4 Incentive Compatibility and Cooperative Game Theory; 5 Concluding Remarks; References; Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory to Managerial Incentivation; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Method. 3 Discussion of Selected Literature3.1 Framework; 3.2 Incentive Type; 3.2.1 Performance-Based Pay and Monetary Incentives; 3.2.2 Options and Stocks; 3.2.3 Non-Monetary Incentives; 3.3 Performance Measures; 3.3.1 Effect of Non-Contractible and Unobservable Information, Precision, Distortion, and Subjectivity; 3.3.2 Application of Specific Measures; 3.3.3 Aggregate, Team-Based and Relative Performance Measures; 3.4 Effects of Risk; 3.5 Monitoring; 3.6 Psychological and Social Aspects; 3.6.1 Personal Characteristics; 3.6.2 Social and Interactional Aspects; 3.6.3 The Behavioural Agency Model. 4 Evaluation of Practical Applicability and Identification of Further Research5 Conclusion; References; Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behaviouraland Multi-Period Performance Measurement Aspects; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Single-Period Incentive Contracts; 2.1 The Standard Agency Model; 2.2 Contract Design and Loss Aversion; 2.3 Contract Design and Identity; 3 Multi-Period Incentive Contracts; 3.1 Stationary Production Technology; 3.2 Non-Stationary Production Technology; 3.3 Renegotiation of Multi-Period Contracts; 4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria-and Alternatives?; 5 Conclusion.
• Publisher Details: Cham, Switzerland : Springer
• Publication Date: 2018
• Copyright Date: 2018
• Extent: 1 online resource (450 pages), illustrations
• Subjects: 658.1511; Business; Managerial accounting; Game theory; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industrial Management; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Management; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Management Science; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Organizational Behavior; Game theory; Managerial accounting; Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Financial Accounting; Game Theory; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Business & Economics -- Accounting -- Financial; Mathematics -- Game Theory; Business & Economics -- Operations Research; Financial accounting; Game theory; Operational research; Management science; Accounting; Operations research; Business & Economics -- Accounting -- Managerial; Finance & accounting; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9783319616032
• Related ISBNs: 331961603X; 9783319616025; 3319616021
• Notes: Note: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.; Note: Print version record.
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.