An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism : Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation /: Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation. ([2018])

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: John Wright..
• Authors: Wright, John
• Contents: Intro; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction: Realism and Reason; 1.1 An Outline of the Argument of the Book; Chapter 2: The Skeptical Arguments Against Realism I: Inductive Skepticism; 2.1 Why a Reply to Humean Skepticism About Induction Is Needed; 2.2 Hume's Argument; 2.3 Analysis of Hume's Argument; 2.4 Reliabilism; 2.5 Synthetic a Priori Reasonable Belief; 2.6 Examples of Synthetic a Priori Reasonable Beliefs; 2.7 Is This Acceptable to a Moderate Empiricist?; 2.8 A Consideration of Some Objections; 2.9 Induction; 2.10 The Principle of Indifference 2.11 Objection: Other Inductive Inferences Can Be Made from the Data2.12 Another Objection: The Possible Influence of the Observer; 2.13 Grue-Bleen Type Predicates; 2.14 Concluding Remarks; Chapter 3: The Skeptical Arguments - 2; 3.1 The Pessimistic Meta-induction on the History of Science; 3.1.1 The Phlogiston Theory of Combustion; 3.1.2 The Caloric Theory of Heat; 3.1.3 The Theory of the "Lumeniferous Ether"; 3.1.4 Rankine's Thermodynamics; 3.1.5 Summary of the Historical Cases; 3.2 The Underdetermination of Theory by Data; 3.2.1 Laudan and Leplin on Underdetermination 3.2.2 Stanford on Realism and Underdetermination3.3 The Problem of Equivalent Descriptions; 3.4 Bayes' Theorem and the Probability of Theories; 3.5 The Experimentalists' Regress; 3.6 The Argument from the Allegedly Unscientific Character of the Hypothesis of Scientific Realism; 3.7 The Theory Laden-Ness of Observation; 3.8 The Objection from Unconceived Possibilities; 3.9 Concluding Remarks; Chapter 4: Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation; 4.1 Some Preliminary Issues; 4.2 The Accessibility of the Fact That a Theory Is "the Best"; 4.3 Probability; 4.4 Simplicity 4.5 Simplicity and Curve-Fitting4.6 Could Appeal to Simplicity Justify Realism?: Some General Remarks; 4.7 Criteria Other Than Simplicity; 4.8 Lipton's Defence of IBE; 4.9 Kitcher's Galilean Strategy for Defending IBE; 4.10 Novel Predictive Success; 4.11 Deployment Realism; 4.12 Underdetermination Again; 4.13 Reliabilism and the History of Science; 4.14 The Argument from Concordance, or the Agreement of Independent Methods; 4.15 Structural Realism; 4.16 IBE Contrasted with the View Advocated Here: A Summary; Chapter 5: On the Inference to Unobservables; 5.1 Eddington's Fish Net 5.2 Eddington's Inference and Induction5.3 Eddington Inferences and Induction: Similarities and Differences; 5.4 Eddington Inferences More Firmly Based than Induction; 5.5 Eddington Inferences and Unobservable Entities; 5.6 Restricted and Unrestricted Eddington Inferences; 5.7 Eddington Inferences and Partitioning; 5.8 Eddington Inferences and the Paradoxes of Induction and Confirmation; 5.9 Inference to Molecules; 5.10 Identifying the Entities to Which We Are Led by Eddington-Inferences with Those Postulated by Explanatory Theories
• Publisher Details: Cham : Springer
• Publication Date: 2018
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 501; Philosophy; Science -- Methodology; Science_xPhilosophy; Chemistry; SCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects; Science -- Mathematical Physics; Science -- Chemistry -- Physical & Theoretical; Mathematical physics; Quantum & theoretical chemistry; Science -- Philosophy & Social Aspects; Philosophy of science; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 3030022188; 9783030022181
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.