Paradox lost : logical solutions to ten puzzles of philosophy /: logical solutions to ten puzzles of philosophy. (2018)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: Michael Huemer.
• Authors: Huemer, Michael, 1969-
• Contents: Intro; Dedication; Preface; Contents; Analytical Contents; List of Figures; 1: Introduction; 1.1 What Is a Paradox?; 1.2 What Is a Solution?; 1.3 How to Seek Solutions; 1.4 Why Paradoxes?; 1.5 Paradoxes Not Covered; References; Part I: Semantic Paradoxes; 2: The Liar; 2.1 The Paradox; 2.2 A Third Truth-Value; 2.3 True Contradictions; 2.4 Meaninglessness; 2.4.1 Self-Reference; 2.4.2 False Presupposition; 2.4.3 Lack of Communicative Use; 2.5 Putting the Blame on Truth; 2.6 A Solution; 2.6.1 An Inconsistent Language; 2.6.2 Meaning Deficiency; 2.6.3 The Truth-Teller 2.6.4 "The Liar Sentence Is Not True" Is True2.6.5 This Sentence Is False or Meaning-Deficient; 2.6.6 Liar Cycles; 2.6.7 Prohibiting Liars; 2.7 Curry's Paradox; 2.8 The Paradox of Non-Self-Applicability; 2.9 Russell's Paradox; References; 3: The Sorites; 3.1 The Paradox; 3.2 Deviant Logic; 3.3 Supervaluationism; 3.4 Epistemicism; 3.5 A Moderate Nihilist Solution; 3.5.1 Fit Determines Content; 3.5.2 When Thoughts Are Vague; 3.5.3 Uncertainty About Vagueness; 3.5.4 Vague Thoughts Make for Vague Language, and Vice Versa 3.5.5 An Argument that Vague Statements Do Not Express Propositions3.5.6 Arguments by Analogy; 3.5.7 Logic Is Classical; 3.5.8 How to Almost Say Something; 3.5.9 Almost Is Good Enough; 3.5.10 Applying Logic to Vague Sentences; 3.5.11 Interpreting 'Truth': Strict Truth vs. Loose Truth; 3.5.12 Why Is There Second-Order Vagueness?; 3.6 Conclusion; References; Part II: Paradoxes of Rational Choice; 4: The Self-Torturer; 4.1 The Paradox; 4.2 Quinn's Solution; 4.3 An Orthodox Solution; 4.3.1 In Defense of Undetectable Changes; 4.3.2 Indeterminacy 4.3.3 In Defense of an Optimal Setting4.3.4 Detectable and Undetectable Values; 4.3.5 Advantages of This Solution; References; 5: Newcomb's Problem; 5.1 The Paradox; 5.2 Objections to the Scenario; 5.3 The Right Expected Utility Principle; 5.3.1 The Right Way to Make Good Things More Likely; 5.3.2 Two-Boxing Maximizes Expected Utility: Doing the Math; 5.3.3 Why This Is the Best Solution; 5.4 The Case of Perfect Reliability; 5.5 Rationality and Long-Run Benefit; 5.5.1 One-Boxers as a Group Do Better; 5.5.2 One-Boxers Tend to Do Better in any Given Case 5.5.3 One-Boxers Do Better in Repeated Games5.5.4 Being a One-Boxer Is Predictably Advantageous; 5.6 Uncertainty About Decision Theory; References; 6: The Surprise Quiz; 6.1 The Paradox; 6.2 Rejecting the Assumptions; 6.3 What Is Surprise?; 6.4 Quiz Comes if and Only if Surprising; 6.4.1 Self-Undermining Beliefs with a Vague Surprise Threshold; 6.4.2 Self-Undermining Beliefs with a Precise Threshold; 6.4.3 The Rest of the Week; 6.5 Quiz Comes, with or without Surprise; 6.5.1 No Friday Surprise; 6.5.2 Borderline Thursday Surprise; 6.5.3 The Rest of the Week
• Publisher Details: Cham : Palgrave Macmillan
• Publication Date: 2018
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 160.1; Philosophy; Logic; Paradox; PHILOSOPHY / Logic; Logic; Paradox; Philosophy -- Movements -- Analytic; Philosophy -- Metaphysics; Analytical philosophy & Logical Positivism; Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology; Analysis (Philosophy); Metaphysics; Philosophy -- Logic; Philosophy: logic; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9783319904900; 3319904906
• Related ISBNs: 9783319904894
• Notes: Note: Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed July 6, 2018)
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.