Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth : the role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics /: the role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics. ([2018])
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth : the role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics /: the role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics. ([2018])
- Main Title:
- Intuitionistic proof versus classical truth : the role of Brouwer's creative subject in intuitionistic mathematics
- Further Information:
- Note: Enrico Martino.
- Authors:
- Martino, Enrico
- Contents:
- Intro; Preface; Contents; 1 Brouwer, Dummett and the Bar Theorem; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Terminology and Symbolism; 1.3 Dummett's Argument; 1.4 Critique of Dummett's Argument; 1.5 Limits of the Eliminability of ζ-inferences; 1.6 Final Considerations; References; 2 Creative Subject and Bar Theorem; 2.1 The Creative Subject; 2.2 The Creative Subject and Existential Statements; 2.3 Equivalence of (PIE) and (BIM); References; 3 Natural Intuitionistic Semantics and Generalized Beth Semantics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Generalized Beth-Models and Natural Models; 3.3 Generalized Natural Models 6 Classical and Intuitionistic Semantical Groundedness6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Construction of Model M; 6.3 Axiomatisation of T; 6.4 The Aczel -- Feferman Intensional Operator; References; 7 Brouwer's Equivalence Between Virtual and Inextensible Order; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Reconstruction of Brouwer's Paper of 1927; 7.3 Comment on Brouwer's Text; 7.4 How Brouwer Misinterpreted Himself; 7.5 A Minor Mistake in the Cambridge Lectures; 7.6 On Posy's Reconstruction; References; 8 An Intuitionistic Notion of Hypothetical Truth for Which Strong Completeness Intuitionistically Holds; 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Symbolism and Conventions8.3 The Failure of Strong Completeness for Natural Semantics; 8.4 Hypothetical Truth; 8.5 Remarks on Hypothetical Truth; 8.6 Generalized Beth Semantics; 8.7 Connection Between Hypothetical Semantics and GB-Semantics; 8.8 A Strong Completeness Proof for GB-Semantics; References; 9Intro; Preface; Contents; 1 Brouwer, Dummett and the Bar Theorem; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Terminology and Symbolism; 1.3 Dummett's Argument; 1.4 Critique of Dummett's Argument; 1.5 Limits of the Eliminability of ζ-inferences; 1.6 Final Considerations; References; 2 Creative Subject and Bar Theorem; 2.1 The Creative Subject; 2.2 The Creative Subject and Existential Statements; 2.3 Equivalence of (PIE) and (BIM); References; 3 Natural Intuitionistic Semantics and Generalized Beth Semantics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Generalized Beth-Models and Natural Models; 3.3 Generalized Natural Models 6 Classical and Intuitionistic Semantical Groundedness6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Construction of Model M; 6.3 Axiomatisation of T; 6.4 The Aczel -- Feferman Intensional Operator; References; 7 Brouwer's Equivalence Between Virtual and Inextensible Order; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Reconstruction of Brouwer's Paper of 1927; 7.3 Comment on Brouwer's Text; 7.4 How Brouwer Misinterpreted Himself; 7.5 A Minor Mistake in the Cambridge Lectures; 7.6 On Posy's Reconstruction; References; 8 An Intuitionistic Notion of Hypothetical Truth for Which Strong Completeness Intuitionistically Holds; 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Symbolism and Conventions8.3 The Failure of Strong Completeness for Natural Semantics; 8.4 Hypothetical Truth; 8.5 Remarks on Hypothetical Truth; 8.6 Generalized Beth Semantics; 8.7 Connection Between Hypothetical Semantics and GB-Semantics; 8.8 A Strong Completeness Proof for GB-Semantics; References; 9 Propositions and Judgements in Martin-Löf; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 Propositions and Judgements; 9.3 Truth and Evidence; 9.4 Metaphysical Realism; References; 10 Negationless Intuitionism; 10.1 Natural Semantics; 10.2 Failure of Strong Completeness; 10.3 Second-Order Negationless Semantics 10.4 Concluding RemarksReferences; 11 Temporal and Atemporal Truth in Intuitionistic Mathematics; 11.1 Introduction; 11.2 Tenselessness and Classical Truth; 11.3 Potential Intuitionism as a Subsystem of Epistemic Mathematics; 11.4 Temporal Truth; References; 12 Arbitrary Reference in Mathematical Reasoning; 12.1 Introduction; 12.2 Some Objections to TAR; 12.3 TAR as Embodied in the Logical Concept of an Object; 12.4 The Ideal Agent; 12.5 Arbitrary Reference and Impredicativity; 12.6 Plural Reference Versus Sets; References; 13 The Priority of Arithmetical Truth over Arithmetical Provability … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Cham, Switzerland : Springer
- Publication Date:
- 2018
- Extent:
- 1 online resource
- Subjects:
- 510.1
Philosophy
Intuitionistic mathematics
Brouwerian algebras
MATHEMATICS / Essays
MATHEMATICS / Pre-Calculus
MATHEMATICS / Reference
Brouwerian algebras
Intuitionistic mathematics
Mathematics -- Logic
Literary Criticism -- General
Philosophy -- Logic
Mathematical foundations
Literary reference works
Mathematical theory of computation
Philosophy: logic
Logic, Symbolic and mathematical
Philology
Computer science
Logic
Mathematics -- History & Philosophy
Philosophy of mathematics
Electronic books - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9783319743578
3319743570 - Related ISBNs:
- 9783319743561
3319743562 - Notes:
- Note: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
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- British Library HMNTS - ELD.DS.341479
- Ingest File:
- 01_291.xml