Oligopoly, auctions and market quality. ([2017])
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Oligopoly, auctions and market quality. ([2017])
- Main Title:
- Oligopoly, auctions and market quality
- Further Information:
- Note: Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar.
- Authors:
- Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh
- Contents:
- Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Oligopoly Theory; 1.1.1 The Classical Literature; 1.1.2 Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly; 1.1.3 Mechanism Design and Regulation; 1.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory; 1.2 Auction Theory; 1.2.1 Why Study Auction?; 1.2.2 Basics of Auction Theory; 1.2.3 Basic Results of the Canonical Model; 1.2.4 Interdependent Values; 1.2.5 Some Other Extensions; 1.2.6 Recent Work and Practical Auction Design; 1.2.7 Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory; 1.3 Market Quality; 1.3.1 Basic Concepts. 1.3.2 Definition and Measures of Market Quality1.3.3 A Historical Background; 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Market Quality; 1.4 Summary of the Book; 2 Allocation of Scarce Resources; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 The 2G Spectrum Scam in India; 2.1.2 The Coal-Block Scam; 2.1.3 Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource; 2.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated; 2.3.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.4 Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs; 2.4.1 Third Stage Equilibrium. 2.4.2 Second Stage Equilibrium2.4.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.5 Strict Capacity Constraints; 2.5.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Market Quality: Quality ofPreface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Oligopoly Theory; 1.1.1 The Classical Literature; 1.1.2 Modern Times: Game Theory and Oligopoly; 1.1.3 Mechanism Design and Regulation; 1.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Oligopoly Theory; 1.2 Auction Theory; 1.2.1 Why Study Auction?; 1.2.2 Basics of Auction Theory; 1.2.3 Basic Results of the Canonical Model; 1.2.4 Interdependent Values; 1.2.5 Some Other Extensions; 1.2.6 Recent Work and Practical Auction Design; 1.2.7 Concluding Remarks on Auction Theory; 1.3 Market Quality; 1.3.1 Basic Concepts. 1.3.2 Definition and Measures of Market Quality1.3.3 A Historical Background; 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Market Quality; 1.4 Summary of the Book; 2 Allocation of Scarce Resources; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 The 2G Spectrum Scam in India; 2.1.2 The Coal-Block Scam; 2.1.3 Appropriate Policy for Allocating Scarce Resource; 2.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Equilibrium Outcome When Costs Are Not Interrelated; 2.3.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.3.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.4 Equilibrium Outcome with Interrelated Costs; 2.4.1 Third Stage Equilibrium. 2.4.2 Second Stage Equilibrium2.4.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.5 Strict Capacity Constraints; 2.5.1 Third Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Second Stage Equilibrium; 2.5.3 First-Stage Equilibrium; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process; 3.1 Introduction; 3.1.1 Market Quality: Quality of Information and Products; 3.1.2 Poor Product Quality: Some Examples; 3.1.3 Incompetent and Fraudulent Inspection; 3.1.4 Summary of Our Findings; 3.1.5 Related Literature; 3.2 The Basic Model; 3.3 Model 1: Corruption in Quality Monitoring. 3.3.1 Model 1-Third-Stage Equilibrium3.3.2 Model 1- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Model 1- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Example; 3.3.5 Model 1: Discussion of the Results; 3.3.6 Concluding remarks on Model 1; 3.4 Model 2: Incompetence in Quality Monitoring; 3.4.1 Model 2 -- Third-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.2 Model 2 -- Second-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.3 Model 2 -- First-Stage Equilibrium; 3.4.4 Concluding Remarks on Model 2; 4 On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Scoring Auction: The Baseline Model; 4.1.2 Examples of Scoring Auctions; 4.1.3 Relevant Literature. 4.1.4 Summary of Our Findings4.2 The Model; 4.3 Equilibrium in First-Score and Second-Score Auctions; 4.3.1 Order Statistics: Some Notations and Preliminaries; 4.4 Equilibrium Characterization; 4.4.1 Equilibrium Score, Quality and Price; 4.4.2 Impact of an Increase in n (The Number of Bidders); 4.5 Expected Scores; 4.5.1 Some Preliminary Results; 4.5.2 Expected Scores: Second-Score Versus First-Score; 4.6 Extension: Total Welfare with `Quality over Price' Scoring Rule; 4.6.1 Total Expected Welfare; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies; 5.1 Introduction. … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Tokyo, Japan : Springer Japan KK
- Publication Date:
- 2017
- Copyright Date:
- 2017
- Extent:
- 1 online resource
- Subjects:
- 337
Economics
Globalization -- Economic aspects
International economic relations
Oligopolies
Markets
Industrial organization
Development economics
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- International -- Economics
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- International -- General
Development economics
Economics
Globalization -- Economic aspects
Industrial organization
International economic relations
Markets
Oligopolies
Business & Economics -- Development -- General
Business & Economics -- General
Development economics & emerging economies
Market research
Management science
Globalization
Business & Economics -- Industrial Management
Economics of industrial organisation
Electronic books - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9784431553960
4431553967 - Related ISBNs:
- 4431553959
9784431553953 - Notes:
- Note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
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