Real fourdimensionalism : an essay in the ontology of persistence and mind /: an essay in the ontology of persistence and mind. (2017)
- Record Type:
- Book
- Title:
- Real fourdimensionalism : an essay in the ontology of persistence and mind /: an essay in the ontology of persistence and mind. (2017)
- Main Title:
- Real fourdimensionalism : an essay in the ontology of persistence and mind
- Other Titles:
- Essay in the ontology of persistence and mind
- Further Information:
- Note: Ludwig Jaskolla.
- Authors:
- Jaskolla, Ludwig
- Contents:
- "Preface"; "Contents"; "Part I The Puzzle of Persistence"; "1 Persistence? From a Philosopher's Point of View"; "1.1 Introductory Thoughts"; "1.2 A Philosophical Trilemma"; "2 Models of Persistence"; "2.1 Terminology and Preliminary Definitions"; "2.2 The 3-Dimensional Picture"; "2.3 The 4-Dimensional Pictures"; "2.3.1 Worm Theory"; "2.3.2 Stage Theory"; "2.3.2.1 The General Picture"; "2.3.2.2 Versions of the Stage Theory"; "2.3.3 Two Final Remarks"; "2.3.3.1 3D-4D-Deflationism"; "2.3.3.2 On Relativity and Persistence"; "3 Summary of the Work" "Part II The Challenges to 4-Dimensionalism "4 Toward a Positive Taxonomy"; "4.1 Linguistic and Epistemic Worries"; "4.2 Argument: The No Change Objection"; "4.2.1 Historic Roots of the No-Change-Objection"; "4.2.2 The No-Change-Objection in Recent Metaphysics"; "4.2.2.1 Change and the B-Theory of Time"; "4.2.2.2 Change and the Identity of Indiscernibles"; "4.2.2.3 The B-Theory Is Not a Theory of Time"; "4.2.3 The No-Change-Objection and the Problem of Change"; "4.3 Argument: A Crazy Metaphysics"; "4.3.1 What Properties Hold Temporal Parts Together?" "4.3.2 Vagueness and 4-Dimensionalism" "4.3.3 What Is the Ontological Status of Temporal Parts?"; "4.4 Argument: Modal Concerns"; "4.4.1 Van-Inwagen's Argument (1990 and 2001)"; "4.4.2 Worms, Stages and Modal Properties"; "4.4.3 Two Solutions"; "4.4.3.1 Lewisian Counterparts"; "4.4.3.2 Aristotelian Modest Realism"; "4.4.4 A Brief Evaluation"; "4.5 Argument: Motions in Homogeneous Masses";"Preface"; "Contents"; "Part I The Puzzle of Persistence"; "1 Persistence? From a Philosopher's Point of View"; "1.1 Introductory Thoughts"; "1.2 A Philosophical Trilemma"; "2 Models of Persistence"; "2.1 Terminology and Preliminary Definitions"; "2.2 The 3-Dimensional Picture"; "2.3 The 4-Dimensional Pictures"; "2.3.1 Worm Theory"; "2.3.2 Stage Theory"; "2.3.2.1 The General Picture"; "2.3.2.2 Versions of the Stage Theory"; "2.3.3 Two Final Remarks"; "2.3.3.1 3D-4D-Deflationism"; "2.3.3.2 On Relativity and Persistence"; "3 Summary of the Work" "Part II The Challenges to 4-Dimensionalism "4 Toward a Positive Taxonomy"; "4.1 Linguistic and Epistemic Worries"; "4.2 Argument: The No Change Objection"; "4.2.1 Historic Roots of the No-Change-Objection"; "4.2.2 The No-Change-Objection in Recent Metaphysics"; "4.2.2.1 Change and the B-Theory of Time"; "4.2.2.2 Change and the Identity of Indiscernibles"; "4.2.2.3 The B-Theory Is Not a Theory of Time"; "4.2.3 The No-Change-Objection and the Problem of Change"; "4.3 Argument: A Crazy Metaphysics"; "4.3.1 What Properties Hold Temporal Parts Together?" "4.3.2 Vagueness and 4-Dimensionalism" "4.3.3 What Is the Ontological Status of Temporal Parts?"; "4.4 Argument: Modal Concerns"; "4.4.1 Van-Inwagen's Argument (1990 and 2001)"; "4.4.2 Worms, Stages and Modal Properties"; "4.4.3 Two Solutions"; "4.4.3.1 Lewisian Counterparts"; "4.4.3.2 Aristotelian Modest Realism"; "4.4.4 A Brief Evaluation"; "4.5 Argument: Motions in Homogeneous Masses"; "4.5.1 Zimmerman's Two Versions of RDA"; "4.5.2 Three Ways of Dealing with RDA"; "5 The Challenge of Insufficient Binding"; "5.1 Formal Models of Persistence" "5.1.1 A New Challenge to 4-Dimensionalism" "5.1.2 Two Remarks on Terminology"; "5.1.3 Relations Between Temporal Parts and Worms"; "5.1.4 Relations Between Stages"; "5.2 Model Theory and 4-Dimensionalism"; "5.2.1 Structural Realism, Models and Reality"; "5.2.2 Model Theoretic Arguments"; "5.2.2.1 What About Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism?"; "5.2.2.2 Skolem-Putnam-Style vs. Epistemic Structural Realism"; "5.2.2.3 Rosenberg-Style vs. Moderate Ontic Structural Realism"; "5.2.3 The Argument in a Nut-Shell"; "5.3 Examples of Insufficient Theories"; "5.3.1 Ted Sider" "5.3.2 Katherine Hawley" "5.3.3 Yuri Balashov"; "5.3.4 Dean Zimmerman"; "5.3.5 Christina Schneider"; "5.3.6 Conclusion"; "5.4 A Metaphilosophical Evaluation"; "5.5 Insufficient Binding and the Problems of 4D"; "Part III Real Fourdimensionalism"; "6 A Metaphilosophical Retrospect: Grounding"; "6.1 Theoretical Explanations and Grounding-Models"; "6.2 Grounding Persistence: `Personal Persistence Matters"; "7 The Exposition of PSP: Part I"; "7.1 Constitutional Ontologies"; "7.2 Physicalistic Stage-Panexperientialism, Or: `Extended Strawsonian Sesmet Theory'" … (more)
- Publisher Details:
- Cham : Springer
- Publication Date:
- 2017
- Copyright Date:
- 2017
- Extent:
- 1 online resource (257 pages)
- Subjects:
- 190
Philosophy
Persistence
Ontology
Reality
Ontology
Persistence
Reality
Philosophy -- Metaphysics
Philosophy: metaphysics & ontology - Languages:
- English
- ISBNs:
- 9783319659275
- Related ISBNs:
- 9783319659268
- Access Rights:
- Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
- Access Usage:
- Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.
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- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD.DS.330552
- Ingest File:
- 02_334.xml