Luck : its nature and significance for human knowledge and agency /: its nature and significance for human knowledge and agency. (2015)

• Record Type: Book
• Further Information: Note: E.J. Coffman Jnr, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, USA.
• Authors: Coffman, E. J, 1976-
• Contents: 1 Lucky Events: The Current Debate and a New Proposal -- 1.1 Three Leading Theories of Luck -- 1.2 Counterexamples to the Leading Theories of Luck -- 1.3 Lucky Events and Strokes of Luck -- 1.4 The Strokes Account: Further Support and Defense -- -- 2 What is a Stroke of Luck?: Enriching the Strokes Account -- 2.1 Initial Statement of the Analysis and Some Important Implications -- 2.2 The Analysis: Revisions and Defense -- 2.3 Putting it All Together: the Enriched Strokes Account of Lucky Events -- 2.4 How the Enriched Strokes Account Handles the Counterexamples to the Literature's Leading Theories of Luck -- -- 3 Knowledge and Luck I: Gettiered Belief and the Ease of Mistake Approach -- 3.1 An Initial Catalog of Kinds of Epistemic Luck -- 3.2 Pritchard on Evidence Luck and Belief Luck -- 3.3 The Scope of Gettiered Belief -- 3.4 The Ease of Mistake Approach to Gettiered Belief: Explanation and Support -- 3.5 Counterexamples to the Ease of Mistake Approach -- -- 4 Knowledge and Luck II: Three More Approaches to Gettiered Belief -- 4.1 From Ease of Mistake to Lack of Credit -- 4.2 Creditability as Explanatory Salience -- 4.3 Creditability as Power Manifestation -- 4.4 Two Riskier Approaches to Gettiered Belief -- 4.5 The Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach to Gettiered Belief -- 4.6 The Risk of Misleading Justification Approach to Gettiered Belief -- 4.6.1 Objection 1: Kelp's Demonic Clock -- 4.6.2 Objection 2: Bogardus's Atomic Clock -- -- 5 Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 5.1 Defending the Possibility of Morally Responsible Action -- 5.2 Four Different Kinds of Luck-Involving Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 5.3 Literal Versions of the Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 5.3.1 An Intriguing Attempted Counterexample to (IA-2) -- 5.3.2 Against the 'at least partly a matter of luck' Readings of (DA-2) and (IA-2) -- 5.3.3 Against (DA/IA-1) -- -- 6 Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck II: Stipulative Arguments for the Proximal -- Determination Requirement and Three Arguments against It -- 6.1 Stipulative Versions of the Direct Argument for the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 6.2 Stipulative Versions of the Indirect Argument for the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 6.2.1 Five Arguments for (MI-2) -- 6.3 Three Arguments against the Proximal Determination Requirement -- 6.3.1 Objections to the Melean Argument -- 6.3.2 Objections to Fischer's Argument -- 6.3.3 Defending the Possibility Argument.
• Publisher Details: New York : Palgrave Macmillan
• Publication Date: 2015
• Extent: 1 online resource
• Subjects: 123/.3; Philosophy; Chance; Fortune; Knowledge, Theory of; Agent (Philosophy); Act (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHY -- Free Will & Determinism; Act (Philosophy); Agent (Philosophy); Chance; Fortune; Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy; Philosophy -- Mind & Body; Ethics & moral philosophy; Philosophy of mind; Genetic epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy of mind; Philosophy -- Epistemology; Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge; Electronic books
• Languages: English
• ISBNs: 9781137326102; 1137326107
• Notes: Note: Includes bibliographical references and index.; Note: Print version record.
• Access Rights: Legal Deposit; Only available on premises controlled by the deposit library and to one user at any one time; The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK).
• Access Usage: Restricted: Printing from this resource is governed by The Legal Deposit Libraries (Non-Print Works) Regulations (UK) and UK copyright law currently in force.